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quantuM thEory: rEaLisM or PragMatisM?1
la teoría cuántica: ¿realismo o Pragmatismo?
Richard Healey
aBstraCt
During his long and extraordinarily productive career Hilary Putnam occasionally 
flirted with pragmatism. But his scientific realism provided a fixed point of  his attempts 
to interpret quantum theory. I have argued recently that pragmatist treatments of  
representation, explanation and probability are keys to understanding how we use 
quantum theory so successfully, and so how it should be interpreted. For Putnam, 
scientific realism is itself  a scientific hypothesis that explains the success of  science. 
If  I am right, the success of  quantum theory undermines this kind of  scientific 
realism while supporting a rival pragmatism. Scientific realism remains immune to 
empirical refutation if  it is viewed not as a scientific hypothesis but as a regulative 
ideal. But a pragmatist view of  quantum theory poses a challenge to a certain kind of  
metaphysical realism.
KEyWords: Hilary Putnam, scientific realism, metaphysical realism, pragmatism, 
quantum theory, measurement problem, non-locality, quantum ontology
rEsuMEn
Durante su larga y extraordinariamente productiva carrera, Hilary Putnam flirteó de 
vez en cuando con el pragmatism. Pero su realismo científico aportó un punto fijo 
para sus intentos de interpretar la teoría cuántica. Recientemente he defendido que 
los tratamientos pragmatistas de la representación, la explicación y la probabilidad 
son claves para comprender cómo usamos la teoría cuántica con tanto éxito y, así, 
como debería ser interpretada. Para Putnam, el realismo científico es en sí mismo una 
hipótesis científica que explica el éxito de la ciencia. Si estoy en lo correcto, el éxito 
de la teoría cuántica debilita esta clase de realismo científico mientras que apoya un 
pragmatismo rival. El realismo científico permanece inmune a la refutación empírica 
1 Since writing this paper I have argued that its pragmatist view of  quantum theory dovetails 
with an attractive form of  quantum realism: see my “Pragmatist quantum realism”, in Steven 
French and Juha Saatsi, eds. Realism and the Quantum, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
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si se ve no como una hipótesis científica sino como un ideal regulativo. Pero una pers - 
pectiva pragmatista de la teoría cuántica plantea un desafío a una cierta clase de rea-
lismo metafísico.
PaLaBras CLavE: Hilary Putnam, realismo científico, realismo metafísico, prag-
matismo, teoría cuántica, problema de la medición, no localidad, ontología cuántica.
1. introduCtion
Hilary Putnam profoundly influenced not just my philosophical views but the 
course of  my life. Stimulated by the clarity and urgency of  his early writings on 
quantum theory and impressed by the easy familiarity with physics from which he 
drew deep philosophical insights, I came to the United States to study with their 
author. Quantum logic never struck me as a promising way to try to make sense of  
quantum theory and I was glad when Hilary came to agree. But in his more recent 
attempts to square quantum theory with scientific realism I see him as putting the 
philosophical cart before the scientific horse.
During his long and extraordinarily productive career Hilary occasionally flirted 
with pragmatism. As I have argued in several recent papers, pragmatist treatments 
of  representation, explanation and probability are keys to understanding how we 
use quantum theory so successfully, and so how it should be interpreted. Scientific 
realism has provided a fixed point in Hilary’s attempts to interpret quantum 
theory. As he has characterized it, scientific realism is itself  a scientific hypothesis 
that explains the success of  science. If  I am right, the success of  quantum theory 
undermines this kind of  scientific realism while supporting a rival pragmatism.
Scientific realism remains immune to empirical refutation if  it is viewed not as 
a scientific hypothesis but as a regulative ideal. The clarity achieved through pursuit 
of  that ideal by Einstein, Schrödinger and Bell revealed the physical resources 
of  quantum entanglement without yielding a realistic interpretation of  quantum 
theory. A pragmatist may join forces with metaphysically-inclined philosophers, 
mathematicians and scientists in endorsing the practical value of  scientific realism 
as a regulative ideal for the long-term future of  physics while cautioning against 
its procrustean application to the interpretation of  the successful quantum theory 
we already have. That way is too cheap, as Einstein said of  Bohm's 1952 theory2.
2 Letter to Max Born dated 12 May 1952: in Born (1971, p.192).
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2. thE FunCtion oF a quantuM statE
A wave function is a mathematical object often used as representative of  the 
quantum state of  a system. In his paper “Quantum mechanics and ontology” 
Putnam gives his view of  the wave function as
a mathematical object that we use to represent a property of  U [the physical 
universe as a whole], much as we use a real number to represent a property when 
we say that an object has a mass of  x grams. (2012, p. 152)
In this view, quantum theory is about at least one physical system—the 
universe—and the role of  the wave function is to represent its physical properties. 
The title of  one famous paper3 notwithstanding, physicists rarely ascribe wave 
functions to the universe: they assign a wave function (density operator, or 
other mathematical object) as quantum state to (type or token) systems like 
electrons, atoms, molecules, spin qubits, superconducting currents, Bose-Einstein 
condensates, radiation fields in cavities and the interacting quantum fields of  
the Standard Model. To the extent that he acknowledges such applications of  
quantum theory, Putnam apparently regards these systems as physical entities, 
and assumes that the point of  ascribing each a wave function as quantum state 
is to represent its physical properties. Yet he concludes this section by saying 
that quantum mechanics in its mathematical form doesn’t divide up the world 
into “entities” and “properties” before going on in the next section to stress the 
need to think seriously about the content of  the theory by asking what quantum 
mechanics is about, what it takes to be physically real. I’ll return to this question 
after presenting a very different view of  the wave function.
The main reason a physicist ascribes a wave function to a system is not to 
represent its properties but to be able to say what is likely to happen when it 
finds itself  in various situations. Somewhat more precisely, it is to be able to apply a 
mathematical algorithm (the Born rule) to that wave function to assign a probability 
to each of  a set of  mutually incompatible and jointly exhaustive eventualities 
that may arise when a system is in a specified situation. The traditional way to 
characterize an eventuality is as a potential outcome when a magnitude (such as 
energy or component of  position, momentum or spin) is measured: application 
of  the Born rule to the system’s quantum state then gives the probability of  each 
possible outcome of  any measurement to which that system may be subjected. 
3 Hartle and Hawking (1983).
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But the vague, anthropocentric term ‘measurement’ has no place in a precise 
formulation of  a physical theory, as Putnam recognized long before Bell presented 
his own forceful objections.4 So we need a better way of  saying what an eventuality 
is and when it may be realized.
When provided with the relevant wave function, the Born rule assigns 
probabilities to magnitude claims of  the form M: s has (QεΔ), locating the value 
of  magnitude Q on physical system s in set Δ of  real numbers (for example, 
the claim that the energy of  a hydrogen atom is less than its 13.6 electron volt 
ionization energy). In this form, neither a magnitude claim nor the Born rule itself  
contains any reference to measurement. But a variety of  “no-go” theorems shows 
that, for most quantum systems, not all Born probabilities can be retrieved as 
marginals of  any joint probability distribution for the simultaneous real values of  
all their magnitudes.5 These results support the orthodox view that at no time does 
every magnitude on a quantum system have a precise value—and in particular, 
that no system ever has a precise position and a precise momentum. For most 
systems s, not all eventualities of  the form M can consistently be simultaneously 
realized, in the sense of  receiving a well-defined Born probability. We need a 
“measurement-free” way to restrict the application of  the Born rule to a class of  
significant magnitude claims about a system in a specified situation.
Quantum theory itself  can be used as a guide here by application of  the 
theory of  decoherence. Application of  (unitary) quantum theory to the interaction 
between a system and (a more or less realistic model of) its environment typically, 
and extraordinarily rapidly, evolves a (pure) quantum state ascribed to the system 
robustly into a state represented not by a wave function but by a mixed density 
operator which is extremely close to diagonal in some “pointer basis” determined 
by the nature of  the interaction with its environment.6 Claims concerning magni-
tudes represented by operators near-diagonal in the pointer basis are thereby 
selected as significant enough to be assigned a probability by the Born rule: the 
4 Putnam, “A philosopher looks at quantum mechanics” (1965) (reprinted in Putnam (1975)): 
Bell, “Against ‘measurement’” (1989) (reprinted in Bell (2004)).
5 See especially Kochen and Specker (1967), Fine (1982). Bohmians, of  course, appeal to an 
unorthodox account of  magnitudes and their measurement to defend their view that a particle 
always has a precise position and momentum. 
6 This terminology is unfortunate since the theory of  decoherence is by no means restricted 
to some ill-defined class of  “apparatus systems”. But it is appropriate at least in so far as many 
common environmental interactions leave the system density operator approximately diagonal 
in an (overcomplete) basis of  approximate position eigenstates. 
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Born rule should not be applied to claims concerning magnitudes represented by 
operators with eigenvectors nowhere near elements of  the pointer basis.
Applying quantum theory in this way does not restrict the Born rule to an ill-
defined class of  measurements. But I suspect that Hilary would raise other objec-
tions to this application. Consider the following passage:
One possible reply is that the time-evolution of  the wave function described by 
the theory can be connected by well-known rules to observable phenomena. But 
this is just the answer of  logical positivism! In effect, the wave function is given 
an “empirical interpretation” by “coordinating definitions”, just as Carnap would 
have said. But this is not the sort of  account that a scientific realist—someone 
who wants to understand quantum mechanics as describing reality, and not just as 
a device for making predictions—is seeking. And I am a scientific realist.7
In the last two sentences of  the passage Putnam simply reiterates his own 
view of  the wave function without argument and notes that it squares with his 
scientific realist predilections. But in the initial part of  the passage he suggests 
that any alternative view of  the wave function according to which it functions 
as a rule rather than as a representation of  physical reality commits some logical 
positivist error. Here I think he overlooks the possibility of  a pragmatist rather 
than a positivist view of  the wave function.
As I see it, the role of  the wave function is not to describe or represent some 
novel physical property, entity or law but to provide good advice to any user 
of  quantum theory about the significance and credibility of  magnitude claims 
about physical systems. It executes its primary function as input to the Born rule. 
By wholly accepting quantum theory any user commits to adjusting credences in 
significant magnitude claims to match their Born probabilities. The wave function 
plays an important preliminary role by advising a user on how significant is 
each magnitude claim about a physical system in a particular situation. To assess 
its significance, the user may apply (unitary) quantum theory to that system in 
interaction with its environment. Given sufficient decoherence, the claim has 
the significance required to license application of  the Born rule to determine 
its credence. This imposes a contextual selection of  which magnitude claims are 
significant enough to be believed to some degree, and which are not.
7 “Quantum Mechanics and Ontology”, in Putnam (2012, p.151): from now on, all references 
to Putnam’s papers specify page numbers in Putnam (2012).
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In both roles, the wave function is connected to magnitude claims by a rule. 
But this is not a semantic rule (an “empirical interpretation” or a “coordinating 
definition”) but a pragmatic rule that prescribes to an agent the appropriate 
cognitive attitude to adopt toward each relevant magnitude claim. Many of  these 
claims concern physical entities that are in no way observable by unaided human 
sense organs.
The reader will have noticed a certain “fuzziness” in my statement of  the 
pragmatic rules governing the use of  the wave function. This is as unproblematic 
as it is inevitable. Bell began his “Against ‘measurement’” with the complaint that 
surely by now we should have an exact formulation of  some serious part of  quantum 
mechanics. This may be achieved simply by dropping von Neumann’s notorious 
“projection postulate” (collapse of  the wave function on measurement) and 
removing any reference to measurement, observation, apparatus, classical system, 
etc. from a statement of  the Born rule in the way I have indicated. Pragmatic rules 
governing the use of  the wave function should not appear in the resulting exact 
formulation: They concern the application of  the theory so formulated. No matter 
how exactly or precisely a scientific theory is formulated, its application always 
requires skill and judgment that cannot be made fully explicit. Any pragmatic rule 
guiding that application remains subject to interpretation by the skilled practitioner.8
A good physicist is able to judge when it is permissible to apply the Born 
rule even without deploying a model of  environmental decoherence—fortunately, 
because environments are typically complex open systems for which there are 
few tractable quantum models of  decoherence and even in these few, completely 
robust and irreversible diagonalization of  system density operator is never more 
than a very good approximation.
I have begun to contrast this pragmatist view of  the wave function with 
Hilary’s realist view. It is now time to say why the pragmatist view is better. In 
each of  the next three sections I briefly describe what many have taken to be a 
deep conceptual problem faced by quantum theory and then indicate why there is 
no problem if  one adopts a pragmatist view.
8 While stressing that rules governing the use of  the wave function are pragmatic rather than 
semantic, I am sympathetic to the suggestion that Wittgensteinian considerations about rule 
following may similarly render semantic rules ineliminably “fuzzy”.
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3. Why thErE is no MEasurEMEnt ProBLEM
The notorious measurement problem has plagued the foundations of  
quantum theory for well over 50 years. From many formulations of  the problem 
I choose this one by Maudlin (1995, p.7), which presents it as an incompatibility 
between three assumptions:
1.A The wave function of  a system is complete, i.e., the wave function 
specifies (directly or indirectly) all of  the physical properties of  a system.
1.B The wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical 
equation (e.g. the Schrödinger equation).
1.C Measurements of  e.g., the spin of  an electron always (or at least usually) 
have determinate outcomes, i.e. at the end of  the measurement the 
measuring device is either in a state which indicates spin up (and not 
down) or spin down (and not up).
In a nutshell, each of  Putnam's favored “realist” approaches proposes to 
solve the problem by rejecting a different assumption. Bohmians reject 1.A: they 
maintain that the wave function does not completely specify all of  the properties 
of  a system of  particles because each particle always has a precise position not 
specified by the wave function. Collapse theorists following Ghirardi, Rimini and 
Weber (1986) reject 1.B by postulating a different, nonlinear, dynamical equation 
for the wave function that differs little from the Schrödinger equation for a single 
particle but nevertheless results in determinate measurement outcomes because 
their enormous number effectively guarantees that the particles in the pointer of  
a measuring device end up described by a wave function that specifies a pointer 
indicating either up or down and not both. Everettians reject 1.C because they take 
the final wave function of  system plus measuring device to specify that the latter is 
both in a state which indicates spin up and in a state which indicates spin down (each 
in a different “branch” world.) Putnam himself  rejects Everettian realism on the 
grounds that probabilities of  measurement outcomes make no sense if  one rejects 
1.C. He acknowledges that each of  the other “realist” options faces difficulties but 
expresses optimism that these may be overcome by further research.
But, in a pragmatist view, no such research is required since the measurement 
problem never arises. A pragmatist should reject 1.A not because the wave function 
of  a system specifies its properties incompletely but because the wave function 
is not in the business of  specifying its properties in the first place! The role of  
the wave function is to provide sound advice on what cognitive attitude to take 
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toward magnitude claims, including claims about the final position of  measuring 
devices’ pointers. It can play this role only on the assumption that significant 
magnitude claims have determinate truth values, and that exactly one of  each 
set of  mutually incompatible and jointly exhaustive significant claims about the 
value of  a magnitude is true. In particular, any reasonable application of  quantum 
theory to a measuring device requires the assumption that its pointer ends up 
pointing in some direction (and not also another), so of  course no wave function 
can be expected to specify why or even that it does.
Rejection of  1.A as based on a mistaken view of  the function of  a quantum 
state suffices to dissolve the measurement problem. But a pragmatist should 
also reject 1.B for a related reason. It is a presupposition of  1.B that a system’s 
wave function specifies its dynamical evolution in the sense of  (at least partially) 
specifying what physical properties it has at each moment. In that case any 
discontinuous, nonlinear change in the wave function correctly ascribed to a 
system implies a change in its physical properties incompatible with the linear 
dynamical equation that otherwise specifies how these change. But as we shall 
soon see there are circumstances in which an agent is correct to ascribe a wave 
function or other mathematical representative of  a quantum state to a system 
that changes discontinuously and nonlinearly while denying that this implies any 
change in the system’s physical properties. This is just what a pragmatist would 
expect, given his view of  the primary role of  a quantum state as input to the 
Born rule. One must sometimes discontinuously change the wave function one 
ascribes to a system in order correctly to update one’s credences in the light of  
newly acquired information. These correctly updated credences do not concern 
the system’s present physical properties but actual or possible future eventualities 
involving it.
4. Why thErE is no quantuM non-LoCaLity
Many people believe that quantum phenomena manifest what Einstein 
referred to as “spooky” action at a distance (while dismissing the possibility). 
Bell’s work is often cited in support of  this belief, as in the following quote from 
a recent expository review:
Bell’s theorem asserts that if  certain predictions of  quantum theory are correct 
then our world is non-local. (Goldstein et. al ((2011), p.1)
Although these predictions have by now been thoroughly verified, their sig-
nificance warrants the continuing extraordinary efforts by experimental physicists 
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to remove all possible remaining loopholes. In “The Curious Story of  Quantum 
Logic” Hilary makes it clear that he shares this belief:
Bell’s theoretical predictions, predictions which unquestionably follow from 
quantum mechanics, and have moreover been experimentally confirmed, show 
that there are causal anomalies that are observable without postulating any exhaustive 
interpretation whatsoever. The phenomena themselves are “causally anomalous”, in 
classical terms. The particular anomaly (“nonlocality”) is observable at the level of  
phenomena. (p. 169)
Later he notes his preference for referring to what Reichenbach called an 
exhaustive interpretation as a coherent realistic interpretation.
Putnam’s main point in this paper is that while modifying classical logic remains 
an extreme option for the scientist, there is no need to resort to it in order to arrive 
at a realistic interpretation of  quantum theory—provided one acknowledges that 
a tenable realistic interpretation inevitably involves “nonlocality”. (And that’s why 
he was wrong to think a realistic interpretation must give up classical logic.) But 
note that in the quoted passage he makes the stronger claim that “nonlocality” is 
inherent in the observable phenomena themselves, not just in a coherent realistic 
interpretation of  them. This claim is hard to assess since he does not say exactly 
what he means by “nonlocality”.9 But on one common understanding of  that term 
a pragmatist view of  quantum theory makes it clear why this stronger claim is false. 
Using quantum theory, we can explain the otherwise puzzling patterns of  correlation 
it correctly predicts without any non-locality as defined by Goldstein et. al (2011):
“Non-local” here means that there exist interactions between events that are too 
far apart in space and too close together in time for the events to be connected 
even by signals moving at the speed of  light.
This definition connects closely to Bell’s own formulation of  locality in “La 
Nouvelle Cuisine”, the last of  an important series of  papers (reprinted in his 
(2004)). He argued there that any seriously formulated theory meeting a local 
9 In an earlier paper (“A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)”) Putnam (p.127) 
says that “locality” means that in experiments set up to test Bell inequalities the measurement 
of  the spin of  particle 1 produces no physical disturbance in particle 2. He adds in a footnote 
that what the locality-violating “disturbance in particle 2” turns out to be is a statistical matter: 
the probabilities of  outcomes of  measurements on particle 2 are altered. I’ll show why on a 
pragmatist view of  quantum theory there is no unique probability capable of  alteration, hence 
no disturbance in this sense.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 5, n.º 1 (2018): 111-138
Richard Healey120
causality condition based on an intuitive conception of  local action tailored to 
the structure of  relativistic space-time predicts correlations different from those 
successfully predicted by quantum theory. Applying this condition to “ordinary 
quantum mechanics” he concluded that quantum theory is neither locally causal 
nor embeddable in a locally causal theory.
Bell (2004, p. 239) begins his argument by stating the following intuitive 
principle of  local causality:
The direct causes (and effects) of  events are near by, and even the indirect causes 
(and effects) are no further away than permitted by the velocity of  light.
Appropriately, he takes this to be too imprecise to serve as a premise in a 
mathematical argument, involving as it does the vague notions of  cause and 
effect. Such words as ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ will not appear in the formulation of  any 
serious theory. But as he points out elsewhere this does not mean that one cannot 
investigate the causal structure of  a theory:
I would insist here on the distinction between analyzing various physical theories 
on the one hand, and philosophising about the unique real world on the other. 
In this matter of  causality it is a great inconvenience that the world is given to 
us once only. We cannot know what would have happened if  something had 
been different. … Physical theories are more amenable in this respect. We can 
calculate the consequences of  changing free elements in a theory, be they only initial 
conditions, and so explore the causal structure of  the theory. (2004, p.101)
Indeed, Bell (2004, p. 239) continues by formulating a local causality condition 
on physical theories of  a certain kind based on his intuitive principle.
Local A theory is said to be locally causal if  the probabilities attached to values
Causality  of  local beables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered by specification 
of  values of  local beables in a space-like separated region 2, when what 
happens in the backward light cone of  1 is already sufficiently specified, 
for example by a full specification of  all local beables in a space-time 
region 3 [a thick space-like slice across the backward light cones of  1, 
2 that intersects every future-directed causal curve emerging from the 
overlap of  their backward light cones]. (2004, pp. 239-40)
This local causality condition is a key assumption in his proof  of  a set of  
Bell inequalities (the so-called CHSH inequalities) whose experimentally observed 
violation is correctly predicted by quantum theory.
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The standard story as to why the quantum predictions are not constrained by 
these inequalities is that quantum theory violates Local Causality—for example, if  the 
z-spin of  each of  a pair of  particles in the singlet state is measured simultaneously 
in regions 1, 2 then the probability of  a device in region 1 indicating “up” is not 
independent of  the outcome registered by a similar device in region 2.
This seems to show several things. First, quantum theory is able to predict the 
observed phenomena only because it violates Local Causality. Second, no theory 
satisfying Local Causality is compatible with the observed phenomena. Finally, 
since Local Causality is simply an explication of  the intuitive principle of  local 
causality, the observed phenomena show that the world is non-local in that there 
are pairs of  events that are directly causally connected even though they are so far 
apart that they cannot be connected even by an influence propagating at the speed 
of  light. If  that’s right then the world is indeed non-local in the sense defined by 
Goldstein et. al (2011).
But the standard story is wrong and these conclusions do not follow. Correctly 
understood, quantum theory does not violate Local Causality, but nor is quantum 
theory a locally causal theory—the condition of  Local Causality is simply inapplicable 
to quantum theory because of  the way quantum states and Born probabilities 
function in that theory.
To apply the condition of  Local Causality one needs to know what local beables 
a theory countenances in regions 1-3. The application of  quantum theory to this 
scenario presupposes that magnitude claims about “pointer readings” in regions 
1, 2 have determinate truth-values sufficient to register the outcomes of  the 
relevant spin-component measurements in those regions: in that sense, quantum 
theory acknowledges these pointer readings as local beables even though they are 
not fundamental local beables postulated by quantum theory. The wave function 
of  the singlet state is not a local beable in quantum theory: it represents no novel 
physical property or entity but serves the quite different function of  advising 
an agent using quantum theory on the significance and credibility of  magnitude 
claims about the pair of  particles to which it is ascribed. Indeed, quantum theory 
acknowledges no relevant local beables in region 3.
Local Causality presupposes that quantum theory attaches probabilities to values 
of  local beables in regions 1, 2. But quantum theory is not a stochastic theory which 
attaches a unique probability to a future event. The Born probabilities it supplies 
are for physically situated agents to adjust their credences in magnitude claims 
whose truth values they are not in a position to determine. Though objective, Born 
probabilities are not beables postulated by quantum theory, intended to specify 
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physical propensities. Their function is to guide the beliefs of  users of  the theory, 
not to represent physical reality. It is for an agent applying the theory to attach 
probabilities by applying the Born rule to a quantum state appropriate to that 
agent’s physical (and specifically spatiotemporal) location. Guidance is required 
only because there are physical limits on the information that is accessible from 
an agent’s physical situation: God has no need of  probabilities because he knows 
everything! Now the structure of  relativistic space-time imposes strict limits on 
accessible information, assuming physical processes propagate only within the 
future light cone. This means that space-like as well as time-like separated agents 
face different informational limitations, and so require guidance tailored to their 
different physical situations.
The Born rule generates advice on the credibility of  a magnitude claim good 
for an agent in a specific physical situation, but only if  applied to the correct 
wave function for one in that situation. A system does not have a wave function, 
independent of  the spatiotemporal situation of  an actual or merely hypothetical 
agent. Sufficiently differently situated agents should use different wave functions 
when assessing the credibility of  the same magnitude claim concerning a system. 
So, whatever the situation of  the system to which it is ascribed, every wave 
function and consequent attachments of  Born probabilities must be relativized to 
the physical situation (and specifically space-time location) of  an actual or merely 
hypothetical user of  quantum theory. The wave function does not present a God’s 
eye view of  physical reality, or even of  objective chance.
Suppose Alice and Bob agreed that when far apart (space-like separated) each 
would measure the spin of  a different spin ½ particle in a pair along a direction 
selected randomly at the last minute—a for Alice, b for Bob. They have repeated 
this many times on many pairs and amassed robust statistics of  their outcomes. 
Suppose also that Alice and Bob agree that each pair of  atoms was emitted so that
i) at every moment on Alice’s world-line prior to her measurement she was 
correct to assign the pair a spin singlet wave function, and
ii) at every moment on Bob’s world-line prior to his measurement he was 
correct to assign the pair a spin singlet wave function.
This agreement is not arbitrary: it is justified by their individual and physicists’ 
collective experience with such systems, as manifested in observed statistics 
confirming the application of  the Born rule to these and similar wave functions in 
a huge variety of  circumstances. How do Alice and Bob now explain the patterns 
of  correlation displayed by their measurement outcomes?
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They first note that quantum theory gives them no reason to doubt their data. 
Massive environmental decoherence of  the right kind at their detectors renders 
claims about the outcome of  each of  their measurements highly significant, thus 
entitling them confidently to report their observations. And the statistical patterns 
in that data are just what anyone accepting quantum theory should expect on the 
basis of  the Born rule, as applied to the singlet spin wave function (which each 
of  them was justified in ascribing to each pair prior to his or her measurement).
But by itself  this is not enough to constitute an explanation, any more than 
the falling barometer suffices to explain the storm it gives us reason to expect. 
What is missing is an account of  what those patterns physically depend on.
While the statistics in the data depend counterfactually on the singlet state 
wave function, this dependence is not physical since the wave function is not a 
physical entity. But conditions in the physical world make this the right wave 
function for Alice and Bob to ascribe to their particle pairs. These conditions are 
expressed by true, significant magnitude claims about physical systems involved 
in the emission of  the pairs. The statistical patterns in the data physically depend 
on these backing conditions. Quantum theory helps Alice and Bob explain the 
statistical patterns in their data by showing why those patterns were just what 
they should have expected, given the wave function they justifiably ascribed to 
the pairs, whether or not they were able to specify the particular physical grounds 
warranting that ascription.
There are features of  the statistics collected by Alice and Bob that remain 
puzzling. While Alice’s relative frequency of  up and down outcomes is independent 
of  b and Bob’s relative frequency of  up and down outcomes is independent 
of  a, the relative frequency of  Alice’s up and down outcomes is not generally 
independent of  Bob’s outcome for fixed b. Indeed, if  one idealizes their results, then 
if  b=a there is a perfect anticorrelation between Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes—she 
gets up if  and only if  he gets down. These dependencies are reflected by the 
violation of  the following condition in a probabilistic model for Alice and Bob’s 
statistics:
 Pa,b(A|B)=Pa(A) (1)
where A represents the outcome (up or down) of  Alice’s measurement of  spin 
along the a direction, and B represents the outcome of  Bob’s measurement of  
spin along the b direction.
But (1) seems to be simply a formal expression of  (an instance of) Local 
Causality for a theory that acknowledges no local beables in region 3! Doesn’t this 
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establish Bell’s claim that quantum theory is not a locally causal theory? And isn’t 
that tantamount to admitting that even in this pragmatist view quantum theory 
reveals a non-local world? I will take these questions in turn and show that the 
answer to both is “No”.
By applying the Born rule to the singlet state Alice, Bob and any other user 
of  quantum theory is warranted in making probabilistic statements concerning 
the outcome of  a measurement of  spin component along direction a by Alice. 
One such statement is that Pa(A)=½, for arbitrary a, whether A indicates spin 
up or spin down: this is true whatever spin component (if  any) Bob measures on 
his particle in the pair. The point of  this statement is not to specify the objective 
propensity of  A but to guide the credence of  any user lacking access to additional 
information, expressible by magnitude claims. This includes Alice before she 
makes her measurement.
Now assume without loss of  generality that Bob makes his measurement in 
region 2 earlier in their shared laboratory frame than Alice’s measurement in region 
1. After Bob has made his measurement, he has access to additional information—
its outcome B. He is well advised to use this information in forming credences as 
to Alice’s possible outcomes. Quantum theory offers him two equivalent ways of  
using it. The first way is to apply the Born rule directly to the singlet state wave 
function to calculate the joint probability Pa,b(A&B) and then to conditionalize on 
his outcome B, giving
 Pa,b(A|B)=Pa,b(A&B)/Pb(B)=1−|<A|B>|2 (2)
Alternatively, he may update the quantum state he ascribes to Alice’s particle 
in the light of  his additional information and then apply the Born rule to this 
updated state, as follows:
	 ρ = ½I →|B>,  P'a(A)=1−|<A|B>|2 (3)
Here the prime indicates this Born probability is calculated using Bob’s updated 
wave function |B>, not the reduced state ½I he correctly assigned to Alice’s particle 
before knowing the outcome of  his own measurement.
Bob’s second way of  proceeding exemplifies the pragmatist view of  “wave 
collapse”. This is not a physical process, but a revision in the advice offered to 
a user of  quantum theory when that user gets access to previously inaccessible 
information. The new information is expressible in the language of  magnitude 
claims which state conditions backing the updated quantum state. Note that in this 
example these conditions concern not the system to which the state is ascribed 
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 5, n.º 1 (2018): 111-138
Quantum Theory: Realism or Pragmatism? 125
(Alice’s particle) but a quite different system. Here as elsewhere a wave function 
does not represent a physical property (e.g. spin component) of  the system to 
which it is ascribed.
The probability Pa,b(A|B)=1−|<A|B>|
2 to which Bob is best advised to set 
his credences on learning his outcome B does not generally equal the probability 
Pa(A)=½: indeed if  a=b, Pa,b(A|B)=0. This is a clear violation of  (1). Why is it 
not also a violation of  Local Causality? For a simple reason: quantum theory does 
not itself  attach a unique probability to each value of  A in region 1. Quantum 
theory yields probabilities to its users by way of  the Born rule. In this situation it 
yields two probabilities for outcome A, one conditional on outcome B, the other 
irrespective of  that outcome. Each serves the function of  advising a situated 
agent on credence in A, but that advice is different for differently situated agents 
in so far as they have access to different information (concerning the outcome 
B). If  Born probabilities were local beables, then at most one of  Pa,b(A|B), Pa(A) 
could correctly specify the value of  that beable in region 1—presumably Pa,b(A|B) 
would express that objective chance, with Pa(A) best understood epistemically, as 
representing the best guess of  someone like Alice who lacks information relevant 
to that chance. But in a pragmatist view there is no such thing as the probability 
of  A—there is only the correct Born probability of  A relative to the situation of  
an actual or merely hypothetical agent well advised to adopt credence in A equal 
to that probability.
The case of  perfect anticorrelations (a=b) should make this particularly clear. 
After getting outcome B, Bob is certain that Alice will get the opposite outcome, 
not-B. Doesn’t this mean that Alice’s outcome not-B was certain as soon as Bob 
got outcome B, whether Alice knew it or not? No: Alice’s outcome is certain given 
Bob’s, just as Bob’s outcome is certain given Alice’s. These relative certainties are 
independent of  the spatio-temporal interval between regions 1 and 2. Quantum 
theory is a source of  good advice to agents on what to believe about events in 
the (relativistic) space-time in which they are physically situated. It is not a theory 
that specifies a unique, objective chance for each possible future event, including 
saying which of  these are certain to occur.
It is wrong to conclude that quantum theory violates Local Causality: a 
pragmatist view of  quantum theory enables one to see why the condition of  Local 
Causality is simply inapplicable to quantum theory. But the patterns of  correlation 
in Alice and Bob’s data successfully predicted by quantum theory seem to cry out 
for a causal explanation, and Bell’s theorem rules out an explanation purely in 
terms of  a Reichenbachian common cause that screens off  Alice’s outcomes and 
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settings from Bob’s. This has convinced many that the observations themselves 
manifest some kind of  space-like causal influence or interaction linking events 
in regions 1 and 2 over and above their connection to events in region 3. Why 
doesn’t the explanation quantum theory offers simply show the world is non-local 
by revealing the nature of  that link?
There was no explicit mention of  causation, interaction or influence in the 
account I gave of  how quantum theory helps us explain patterns in Alice and Bob’s 
data that violate Bell inequalities. To draw any conclusions about non-locality one 
must defend an account of  causation/interaction/influence that makes explicit 
the claimed connection to non-locality. A natural way to do so is in terms of  
counterfactuals.
Maudlin (2011, p118) makes the following assumption:
(SC)
 ...given a pair of  space-like separated events A and B, if  A would not have occurred 
had B not occurred even though everything in A’s past light cone was the same 
then there must be superluminal influences. (p. 118)
This may be applied directly to the outcomes of  Alice and Bob’s measu-
rements on a single pair of  particles. Quantum theory itself  does not imply the 
counterfactual in the antecedent of  (SC). But by mandating maximal credence in 
the consequent of  this counterfactual, conditional on its antecedent, it does the 
next best thing. In this sense, quantum theory supports that counterfactual: A and 
B are indeed counterfactually dependent in this situation. If  (SC) is true, then it 
also supports the conclusion that our world is non-local in the sense of  Goldstein 
et. al (2011). But the explanation of  patterns in their data Alice and Bob can give 
using quantum theory undermines (SC)!
Consistent with that explanation, any superluminal influence would have to 
link an event in region 1 and an event in region 2. In a pragmatist view, quantum 
theory acknowledges no beables (local or non-local) capable of  connecting 
distant setting to local outcome, and each of  Alice and Bob assign the same Born 
probability to their own outcome irrespective of  their partner’s setting. So, any 
superluminal influence would have to link their outcomes.
Nothing in relativistic space-time breaks the symmetry between the pair of  
space-like separated regions 1 and 2. Moreover, the explanation Alice gives of  
their data is symmetrically related to that given by Bob (she takes his outcome 
counterfactually to depend on hers, while he takes her outcome counterfactually to 
depend on his). If  these counterfactual dependencies correspond to a superluminal 
influence between their outcomes then this is either mutual or merely relative to 
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their respective situations. While (SC) does not use causal terminology explicitly, 
his surrounding discussion makes clear that Maudlin assumes that any superluminal 
influence would be causal—indeed, what could be meant by a noncausal influence?
So, if  there is superluminal influence between Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes it is 
either because each is a cause of  the other or because relative to Alice’s situation 
her outcome is a cause of  Bob’s (but not vice versa), while relative to Bob’s situation 
his outcome is a cause of  Alice’s (but not vice versa). A perspectival treatment of  
causation has indeed been advocated by Price (2007) according to which for certain 
events e, f whether e causes f or vice versa might be sensitive to extreme differences 
in the physical situations of  a pair of  merely hypothetical agents. But Alice’s and 
Bob’s situations do not differ in this way. Moreover, Price’s perspectival treatment 
is based on a manipulationist approach to causation along very similar lines to that 
which I shall use to argue against the view that the counterfactual dependencies 
acknowledged by Alice and Bob evince superluminal influences.
Goldstein et. al (2011) characterize non-locality in terms of  an interaction between 
space-like separated events, and this seems the right way to describe some possible 
mutual causal influence between Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes, consistent with the 
symmetries of  their situation. But the explanation of  their data they are able to give 
using quantum theory makes no mention of  any such influence, and recent work 
on causation shows there are excellent reasons to resist glossing the counterfactual 
dependency each acknowledges between their outcomes as causal. In a pragmatist 
view there is no non-local interaction between these outcomes or between any other 
space-like separated events involved in violations of  Bell inequalities.
A central theme of  much recent work on causation and causal modeling by 
philosophers, computer scientists and a variety of  social scientists and medical 
researchers is that the best way to assess the causal relations obtaining among a 
set of  probabilistically related variables is to ask what would happen under various 
hypothetical interventions. In an approach like that of  Woodward (2003) these 
are not required to be technically feasible human operations, or even physically 
possible processes. The idea is that where variables X, Y are probabilistically 
related then X is a cause of  Y only if  some intervention that changes the value of  
X thereby also changes the value of  Y, or at least its probability distribution. But 
if  one cannot even make sense of  the idea of  intervening on X, then X is not a 
cause of  Y.
Can one make sense of  the idea of  intervening in the outcome of  (say) Bob’s 
local measurement, and would any such intervention change the outcome of  Alice’s 
distant measurement, or at least its probability distribution? In a pragmatist view of  
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 5, n.º 1 (2018): 111-138
Richard Healey128
quantum theory, no local action of  Alice or Bob could alter either of  their outcomes 
without disrupting the pair of  particles concerned (e.g. by preparing a different 
quantum state). In particular, choosing to measure a different spin component 
would not have this effect. Quantum theory itself  provides no resources on which 
one can draw to make sense of  an intervention capable of  changing the outcome 
of  Alice’s or Bob’s measurement of  a fixed component of  spin.
In his sophisticated discussion of  what the possibility of  intervention requires, 
Woodward (2003, pp. 130-3) argues that an intervention must be conceptually 
possible, though it need not be physically possible. He considers a case in which 
an event C that is a potential locus of  intervention occurs spontaneously in the 
sense that it has no causes. He argues that even in this case one can make sense of  
an intervention on C. This suggests that one can still make sense of  the idea of  an 
intervention that alters the outcome of  Bob’s measurement. But if  one examines 
Woodward’s conditions on an intervention it turns out that if  these could all be 
met here then the acknowledged counterfactual dependencies between these 
outcomes are not both causal.
Woodward (2003, p. 98) states necessary and sufficient conditions for I to be 
an intervention variable for X with respect to Y. These include
(I2)
 I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is, certain values of  
I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to depend on the values of  
other variables that cause X and instead depends only on the value taken by I.
Suppose some intervention variable I could meet this condition with respect 
to Bob’s outcome variable B. Either Alice’s outcome variable A is a cause of  B or 
it is not. If  it is, then (I2) implies that I makes B cease to depend on A: the value of  
A may be held fixed or freely varied under the intervention I that sets the value of  
B. But this hypothetical intervention would show that B causes A only if  it were 
to change the value of  A, or at least its probability distribution. If  A is held fixed 
under I it is obviously not changed by it. But if  A is varied at will then it has no 
probability distribution, so I cannot be said to change the probability distribution 
of  A. Hence A is not a cause of  B. So, I is an intervention variable for B only if  A 
is not a cause of  B. But if  there is no possible intervention variable for B then B is 
not a cause of  A. It follows that either A is not a cause of  B or B is not a cause of  
A. Consequently, there is no mutual causal interaction between A and B.10
10 The symmetry of  the situation permits an extension of  this argument to establish the 
stronger conclusion that neither of  A or B is a cause of  the other.
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On an interventionist approach to causation amenable to a pragmatist 
interpretation of  quantum theory, anyone accepting quantum theory should take 
some physical event backing the assignment of  the singlet state as common cause 
of  Alice and Bob’s separated outcome events. But she should reject the claim that 
a local setting is a cause of  a distant outcome, since in this case there is not even 
any counterfactual dependence between these events. She should reject any claim 
of  causal dependence between the outcomes. Finally, she should reject any claim 
of  superluminal influence or interaction. Bell’s argument based on local causality 
establishes no such thing. If  you accept quantum theory you have no reason to 
believe that our world is non-local in any of  these senses.
These are important conclusions, but they leave one of  Putnam’s points 
unaddressed. More than once in “The Curious Story of  Quantum Logic” he 
notes (with apparent endorsement) Reichenbach’s view that for an account to be 
non-anomalous action-by-contact must be obeyed. I have argued that there is no 
failure of  action-by-contact between any space-like separated events involved in 
violations of  Bell inequalities—because there is no action! But I just acknowledged 
that something happening in a region time-like or null-separated from regions 1, 
2 is a common cause of  effects in those regions, while admitting that quantum 
theory leaves Alice and Bob with nothing to say about what connects this common 
cause to its effects. One thing notably missing from the explanation of  violations 
of  Bell inequalities we can give using quantum theory is an account of  any causal 
processes propagating from events involved in preparing a spin singlet pair to the 
outcomes of  spin-measurements on its particles. Such an account would secure 
conformity to Bell’s intuitive principle of  local causality. Like Putnam, I would like 
to see a theory that could either fill that gap or make it clear why it is a mistake 
to try to do so. Unlike him, I don’t see this in quantum theory or likely to emerge 
from current attempts to square it with scientific realism.
5. What is quantuM thEory aBout?
Putnam is quite right when he says
Obviously, quantum mechanics in its standard form does not wear its beables, local 
or otherwise, on its sleeve. (p. 153)
A theory’s beables are what it says there is in the physical world. If  we had 
an agreed formulation of  quantum theory in first order logic, they would be 
represented by the physical entities in its domain of  quantification and the predicates 
it employs when attributing physical properties and relations to them—its ontology 
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and ideology, in Quine’s terminology. I have argued that a wave function denotes 
no physical entity and does not attribute physical properties: it is not a beable in 
quantum theory. Since magnitude claims attribute physical properties to physical 
entities they do speak of  beables. But quantum theory itself  neither contains nor 
implies any magnitude claims—it merely advises its users on their content and 
credibility. So, it does not follow that quantum theory is about the beables spoken 
of  by magnitude claims.
Nevertheless, as Putnam says,
In the case of  “standard” quantum mechanics, there is clearly an entity the theory 
assumes to exist, namely, the “system”. (pp. 151-2)
Quantum theory assumes this in the sense that anyone using the theory ascribes 
a quantum state to some system or systems. In the case of  non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics, this system often seems clearly physical, as when one ascribes a wave 
function to an electron or hydrogen atom in order to predict or explain some aspect 
of  its behavior by applying the Born rule to magnitude claims about it. But the 
status of  the system is less clear in other applications. Physicists commonly speak 
of  the quantum mechanics of  the simple harmonic oscillator, a two-level system, 
or the center of  mass system of  an atom or molecule, and quantum information 
theorists spend most of  their time analyzing systems of  qubits. In such cases the 
immediate focus is on features of  an abstract system in a quantum model, albeit with 
an eye to future applications of  this model to physical systems.
Currently fundamental forms of  quantum theory are relativistic quantum field 
theories. These assign quantum states to systems of  quantum fields, or (in algebraic 
quantum field theory) to nets of  local operator algebras. Based on theories of  a 
system of  relativistic quantum fields, the Standard Model of  elementary particles 
has been highly successful. One naturally assumes that these theories are about 
elementary particles, and that they describe them very accurately. However, this 
assumption has been all but refuted by powerful recent arguments.11 Moreover, 
some of  these same arguments apply equally well against a field ontology for a 
system of  quantum fields such as those of  the Standard Model.12 What on earth 
could these theories be about?
The pragmatist has a simple answer. A quantum field theory is about quantum 
fields! But although its application presupposes the existence of  some physical 
11 Ruetsche (2011) provides an excellent introduction.
12 See Baker (2009).
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system—Wilczek (2015) calls it a quantum fluid—what the theory actually describes 
is not physical: it is an abstract mathematical structure in a quantum model.13 
The function of  that model is to offer sound advice to a user of  the theory on 
the content and credibility of  magnitude claims attributing physical properties 
to physical entities that are not quantum fields (nor are they quantum fluids). 
Decoherence of  quantum field systems sometimes endows a claim about particles 
with enough significance to license a user to apply the Born rule in forming 
beliefs about physical properties of  those particles, such as the number, energy or 
momentum of  photons in a cavity. In other circumstances, one may be licensed 
to form beliefs about (say) the frequency of  the classical radiation field in a laser, 
modeled by a quantized electromagnetic field system.
Quantum theory is about quantum systems, quantum states (represented by 
wave functions and other mathematical entities), quantum “observables” and other 
operators (including quantum fields), and Born probabilities. There are many true 
statements about them. These include the statement that the ground state wave 
function of  the hydrogen atom is spherically symmetric and the statement that 
the Higgs field has a non-zero vacuum expectation value. But since no quantum-
theoretic statement speaks of  distinctively quantum physical entities or attributes 
distinctively quantum physical properties, quantum theory introduces no beables 
of  its own. Hydrogen atoms were acknowledged as physically real long before the 
advent of  the theory that enabled us to refer to their quantum states: the Higgs 
particle recently discovered at CERN is not described by the quantum field theories 
of  the Standard Model that offer us good advice as to what to believe about 
it. Like evil and the number 17, quantum states and probabilities are objectively 
real but neither physical entities nor physical properties. In some (but not other) 
applications, a quantum state is ascribed to a physically real system such as an 
atom or electron. Quantum theory provides us with no new terms referring to 
physical properties of  even these systems: but it is a source of  wise advice on how 
to describe them better using terms from other theories or elsewhere. Quantum 
13 Putnam (p.57 fn.12, p.64) refers to a physics paper as providing an example of  conceptual 
relativity. He claims this provides two equivalent descriptions of  the same physical reality (a 
system of  particles) whose mind-independently real condition can be represented in each of  
these perfectly intertranslatable ways, despite their different ontologies. But what these two 
ways actually represent is a system of  quantum fields in two dimensions—one representing 
the fields as fermionic, the other as bosonic. This shows nothing about physical ontology or 
ideology since quantum fields are here represented as mathematical structures in models that 
do not depict particles—neither as bosons nor as fermions.
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theory implies no new statements about the physical world: but by helping us to 
improve our beliefs about the physical world it enables us vastly to increase our 
abilities to predict, control and explain what happens in it.
6. What aBout sCiEntiFiC rEaLisM?
While stressing that he has always been a scientific realist, Putnam (2012, p.53) 
reiterates a formulation of  that view he gave in 1976. He began there by saying 
“In one way of  conceiving it, realism is an empirical theory” before presenting his 
famous “no miracle” argument taking the success of  science and the preservation 
of  reference under scientific theory change as evidence for scientific realism. A 
footnote (p.55) endorses a formulation of  Boyd as influencing this conception 
of  scientific realism—that terms in a mature science typically refer, and theories 
accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true. The realist explanation 
of  these features of  science (success and reference preservation) is that scientists 
mirror the world—in the sense of  constructing symbolic representations of  their 
environment—and that science succeeds in the way it does because these symbolic 
representations become increasingly accurate as science progresses.
In a pragmatist view, what is distinctive about the success of  quantum theory is 
precisely that it is not due to introduction of  new symbols (for beables) permitting 
us to represent novel structures in the physical world. Quantum theory introduces 
terms like ‘quantum state’ and ‘quantum field’ with a different function in quantum 
models. They are not intended to mirror the physical world but to guide scientists 
and other situated agents in better deploying representational resources they already 
have or are engaged in developing.
One can try to reconcile this view of  quantum theory with Boyd-Putnam 
scientific realism by noting that
i) when applying quantum theory scientists still talk about the same physical 
entities (atoms, electrons, etc.) and ascribe them the same physical properties 
(mass, charge, energy, etc.) as before, so the reference of  our terms has 
been preserved through the quantum revolution, and
ii) applications of  quantum theory have improved the ways we are able to 
use these terms to refer, both by increasing our abilities to predict, control 
and explain natural phenomena and by advising us in what environmental 
contexts we can use these symbols to make significant claims about physical 
entities and properties
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iii) Boyd-Putnam scientific realism already acknowledged exceptions to the 
typically referential role of  theoretical terms (Putnam (p. 149) notes Bell’s 
disqualification from local beable status of  “non-physical” electromagnetic 
potentials).
But that would be to miss the point that even if  an important long-term scientific 
aim is improved symbolic representation of  the physical world, science may at times 
progress faster by introducing terms without that representational function. Language 
and other symbolic systems provide scientists and the rest of  us with wonderful 
tools for achieving our goals. But these tools don’t always function in the same way. 
Perhaps the central pragmatist moral of  quantum theory is that scientists may find 
new ways of  furthering long-term scientific realist aspirations by creating theories 
whose key terms do not function as representations of  physical reality.
7. a quantuM ChaLLEngE to MEtaPhysiCaL rEaLisM
Hilary Putnam was always a scientific realist, but his views on metaphysical 
realism evolved over the years in ways charted in several essays in his (2012). I 
re cently learned of  an argument that quantum theory challenges a particular kind 
of  metaphysical realism. I am sorry not to have had the opportunity to discuss this 
argument with Hilary. I think he would have loved the argument; because of  the 
challenge it presents to that kind of  metaphysical realism; and because it would have 
provoked him further to refine or even modify his kind of  metaphysical realism.
Realists may disagree about whether wave functions represent something 
physically real, whether electrons have precise momenta and positions, and whe-
ther the world is non-local. But on one point they (nearly!) all agree: quantum 
measurements have physically real outcomes whose statistics are correctly 
predicted by quantum theory. The argument seeks to show that this assumption is 
inconsistent with the universal applicability of  quantum theory itself. There is no 
space here to present it in full detail (see Frauchiger and Renner, 2016) so I will 
give an informal sketch of  a simpler version I heard from Matthew Pusey.
Consider the following (completely practically unrealizable!) thought-experiment. 
Suppose that Alice and Bob decide to conduct measurements of  various pola-
rization components on a large number of  pairs of  photons, where each pair is 
assigned the same entangled state. Being lazy, they do not at first perform any 
measurements themselves, but delegate that task to their friends, Ann and Bill, each 
of  whom performs the required measurements in his or her otherwise completely 
physically isolated laboratory. For each pair of  photons, Ann measures polarization 
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of  one photon with respect to axis a1 while Bill measures polarization of  the 
other photon with respect to axis b1. By assumption, each of  their measurements 
has a physically real outcome (as registered in their notebooks or stored in their 
computers): and quantum theory correctly predicts the correlations between these 
outcomes from the joint probability distribution P(a1, b1) calculated by application 
of  its Born rule to the entangled state assigned to the pairs.
After each photon pair is measured by Ann and Bill, Alice and Bob bestir 
themselves. Instead of  asking Ann and Bill what outcomes they observed, they 
apply very carefully tailored interactions to the entire contents of  each of  their 
laboratories (including Ann and Bill themselves inside their labs). They do this 
repeatedly, for each photon pair independently. Quantum theory then predicts 
that the effect of  these interactions is to restore each photon pair to its original 
entangled state and to restore each lab + occupant to its state prior to the 
polarization measurement. Finally, Alice measures polarization of  one photon in 
each pair with respect to axis a2 while Bob measures polarization of  the other 
photon with respect to axis b2.
By assumption, each of  Alice’s and Bob’s measurements also has a physically real 
outcome (as registered in their notebooks or stored in their computers): and quantum 
theory correctly predicts the correlations between these outcomes from the joint 
probability distribution P(a2, b2) calculated by application of  its Born rule to the same 
entangled state assigned to the pairs. Given our working assumption, quantum theory 
also correctly predicts the correlations between Ann’s outcomes and Bob’s from the 
probability distribution P(a1, b2), and between Bill’s outcomes and Alice’s from the 
probability distribution P(a2, b1), each of  which may again be calculated by applying 
the Born rule to the same entangled state assigned to the pairs.
If  the entangled photon state and the axes a1, a2, b1, b2 are chosen appropriately, the 
probabilistic correlations predicted in this way by quantum theory will violate a Bell 
inequality (the so-called CHSH inequality). But since they constitute a joint distribution 
over all four measured variables the statistics of  these assumed real outcomes will 
always conform to that inequality. We have a contradiction. So, the assumption is false: 
quantum measurements do not always have physically real outcomes whose statistics 
are correctly predicted by quantum theory. But predictions of  quantum theory have 
always been confirmed by the statistics of  measurement outcomes. So, we cannot 
assume that these measurement outcomes are always physically real!
Some (quantum Bayesians—see my (2016)) deny the objectivity of  measure-
ment outcomes, maintaining that any outcome remains essentially personal to 
the agent who provokes it through his or her actions on the world. Carlo Rovelli 
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(1996) takes every statement describing the outcome of  a measurement to be 
relational rather than absolute: it expresses just a relation between the measured 
system and another quantum system that interacted with it.
In my (2017) view a quantum measurement has an objective physical outcome, 
and a statement about that outcome has a determinate, non-relational, mind-
independent truth-value. But acceptance of  quantum theory modifies the content of  
the statement by restricting what inferences may legitimately made from its truth. 
That content is a function of  the physical environment of  the system concerned. In 
all practically realizable circumstances the environmental context involves massive 
decoherence of  the system’s quantum state, so that all physical observer-systems 
(not only human agents like Alice, Bob and friends) may legitimately attribute an 
essentially “classical” content to a statement about any measurement outcome in 
that environment. But in the (completely practically unrealizable) circumstances 
described in the thought-experiment this is not so, since Alice, Bob and friends 
do not share a single environmental context. In that situation they (and we) may 
continue to agree that there are true statements about their physical measurement 
outcomes with objective, mind-independent content. But that content does not 
license reliable inferences between different environmental contexts.
Decoherence confined to each of  their individual laboratories supplies the 
environmental context underlying the content of  each claim about the outcome 
of  a measurement in that lab. For Ann and Bill physically to have exchanged 
information they would have had to join their environmental contexts to form a 
unified context into which their statements about their outcomes may be reliably 
exported. Alternatively, either Ann or Bill might have physically exchanged infor-
mation with Alice or Bob without first exchanging information with each other, 
permitting each reliably to export statements about his or her outcomes into that 
different context. The upshot is that while each statement about the outcomes 
of  measurements on each of  an entangled pair of  photons has objective and 
essentially “classical” content within an environmental context, there is no such 
context in which a statement about the outcomes of  two measurements on a 
single photon has well-defined content.
What are the implications for metaphysical realism? Consider the sentence Sn:
The nth photon was recorded as vertically polarized with respect to the a1 axis.
Suppose Ann makes a statement asserting something by uttering Sn as a 
sincere report of  the outcome of  one of  her measurements on a photon from the 
entangled pair. Then
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1. This statement is true.
2. This statement cannot be verified by anyone (including Ann) after Alice 
and Bob have made their measurements on this photon pair: all traces of  
this outcome (including Ann’s memories) have been completely erased by 
their interventions.
Putnam (2012, p. 68) would add
3. To assert that Sn is true is to assert the same thing as Sn.
Suppose that Alice now makes a statement asserting something by uttering 
the sentence S*n as a sincere report of  the outcome of  one of  her measurements 
on a photon from the nth entangled pair.
S*n: The nth photon was recorded as vertically polarized with respect to the a2 axis
Then
4. This statement is true.
5. While Alice and Bob can verify S*n, no-one can verify both Sn and S*n.
Putnam (2012, p. 68) would add
6. To assert that S*n is true is to assert the same thing as S*n.
(1) - (6) all apparently accord with the metaphysical realism espoused by Putnam 
in (2012). But then on page 69 we find:
“to say, as I do, that when we describe things, in Sellars’s ‘broadest possible sense 
of  the term,’ we are answerable to those things, and that when we describe them 
correctly, there is an aspect of  reality that is as we assert it to be, is to be a realist 
in one’s view of  ‘how things, in the broadest possible sense of  the term, hang 
together.’”
and on page 88:
“On an externalist-functionalist story, for either our beliefs or the proto-beliefs of  
animals and prelinguistic children to have content is just for them to function as 
representations of  external states of  affairs.”
I would have liked to ask Hilary whether the contextual account of  truth and 
the environment-sensitive account of  content I take to be involved in accepting 
quantum theory accord with his kind of  realism. Sadly, I will never get the chance 
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to do so. We philosophers must carry on without his unique combination of  brilliant 
insights and good sense.
Richard Healey
University of  Arizona
rhealey@email.arizona.edu
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